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The paper presents an eﬃcient solution to decision problems where direct partial information on
the distribution of the states of nature is available, either by observations of previous repetitions of
the decision problem or by direct expert judgements.
To process this information we use a recent generalization of Walley’s imprecise Dirichlet model,
allowing us also to handle incomplete observations or imprecise judgements, including missing data.
We derive eﬃcient algorithms and discuss properties of the optimal solutions with respect to several
criteria, including Gamma-maximinity and E-admissibility. In the case of precise data and pure
actions the former surprisingly leads us to a frequency-based variant of the Hodges–Lehmann crite-
rion, which was developed in classical decision theory as a compromise between Bayesian and mini-
max procedures.
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When applying the theoretical framework of decision theory to substantial science
problems, decision makers typically have only limited information about probability dis-
tributions involved in the problem, and so the analysis is associated with large uncertainty.
As a result, decision makers are frequently confronted with the problem that the very
demanding and strong conditions of the classical probability calculus, and the decision
models based on it, are not satisﬁed. Then it is indispensable to ask how to take into
account the limitation of information and what conclusions can be drawn on the basis
of such limited information.
Various tools for sophisticated uncertainty representation generalizing the common
(‘classical’) concept of probability can be found in the literature, including Dempster–Sha-
fer structures [18,42], interval-valued probabilities [51], imprecise probabilities [33,49], see
also [6,12,13]. The corresponding decision making models have been developed in
accordance with the diﬀerent types of the uncertainty representation (e.g. [1,3,20,36,23,
37,43,47,53]). In contrast to standard decision theory, these models allow to handle partial
information about the stochastic behavior of the states of nature.
Here we explicitly take into account the construction of the information and consider
decision problems where direct data on the states are available. The data are of multino-
mial structure, consisting of independent categorical observations. As usual, real values
can be associated with the observations as long as the ordering in these values is not under-
stood as providing additional information. In addition, the model also seems to be suitable
for processing expert judgements, as long as they are based on independent sources of
information.
A particularly attractive feature of our method is that it will prove to be able to incorpo-
rate even set-valued observations, i.e., to handle situations where the corresponding
category cannot be observed exactly and is only known to belong to a certain subset of
the sample space. This is an important issue in many applications, but up to now there is
no unique terminology. Depending on the context, diﬀerent terms are common, like ‘coarse
data’, or ‘incomplete data’, to denote such data sets as a whole, and ‘imperfect measure-
ment’ or ‘interval-valued observations’, to denote the single set-valued observations.
To process complete multinomial data a Bayesian would recommend to use the Dirich-
let model (for ease of distinction called precise Dirichlet model (PDM) in the sequel). The
PDM has been widely adapted to many applications due to interesting statistical proper-
ties, in particular, due to the important fact that the Dirichlet density functions constitute
a conjugate family of density functions with respect to multinomial likelihoods. A very
promising generalization of the PDM, taking into account lack of prior information, is
Walley’s imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM), (cf. [50]; for a recent survey of applications
see [7]).
This paper applies the IDM to decision making and derives simple algorithms for com-
puting optimal randomized and pure actions. The method developed solves two practically
important problems that cannot be addressed by any of the classical approaches to deci-
sion theory in a satisfying manner: ﬁrst of all, relying on the IDM enables us to take into
account explicitly that the number of judgements or measurements may be rather small,
i.e. much small for being able to apply asymptotic arguments, based on the consistent
estimation of the distribution of the states of nature. Secondly, we allow information
about states of nature to be represented by imprecise, i.e., for instance, interval-valued
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sidering a set of IDMs.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we formulate the problem under consid-
eration more precisely. After having recalled some basic aspects of the imprecise Dirichlet
model in Section 3, we apply it in Section 4 to the decision problem. In Section 5 we derive
algorithms to determine the optimal randomized and unrandomized actions under a pes-
simistic criterion relying on strict ambiguity aversion. Section 6 extends consideration to
imprecise observations and judgements. Close relations to Dempster–Shafer decision mak-
ing will be illuminated, and a numerical example will be analyzed. Section 7 glances at
more complex decision criteria and Section 8 concludes with some ﬁnal remarks.
2. Statement of the decision problem
Consider the basic model of decision theory: one has to choose an action from a non-
empty, ﬁnite set A ¼ fa1; . . . ; ar; . . . ; ang of possible actions. The consequences of every
action depend on the true, but unknown state of nature x 2 X = {x1, . . . ,xj, . . . ,xm}.
The corresponding outcome is evaluated by the utility function u : ðA XÞ !
R; ða;xÞ 7! uða;xÞ and by the associated random variable u(a) on ðX;PoðXÞÞ taking the
values u(a,x).1 Often it makes sense to study randomized actions, which can be understood
as a probability measure k = (k1, . . . ,kr, . . . ,kn) on ðA;PoðAÞÞ. Then u(Æ) and u(Æ) are
extended to randomized actions by deﬁning uðk;xÞ :¼Pnr¼1uðar;xÞkr. Let K denote the
set of all randomized actions and identify every pure action ar 2 A with the corresponding
randomized action where k(ar) = 1 and k(as) = 0, for all s5 r.
This model contains the essentials of every (formalized) decision situation under uncer-
tainty and is applied in a huge variety of disciplines. If the states of nature are produced by
a perfect random mechanism (e.g. an ideal lottery), and the corresponding probability
mass function p(Æ) on the sample space X is completely known, then the Bernoulli principle
is almost unanimously favored.
Then one chooses the randomized action maximizing the expected utility
EpuðaÞ :¼
Xm
j¼1
uða;xjÞ  pðxjÞ and EpuðkÞ :¼
Xm
j¼1
uðk;xjÞ  pðxjÞ ð1Þ
among all a 2 A and all k 2 K, respectively. For simplicity, in the sequel the obvious con-
straints kjP 0 will be omitted in most places, and we often use the following abbreviated
notation:
pj :¼ pðxjÞ; urj :¼ ðar;xjÞ; ur :¼ uðarÞ; ur :¼ min
j¼1;...;m
urj;
ur :¼ max
j¼1;...;m
urj; 1 :¼ ð1; . . . ; 1ÞT:
Here we aim at developing a powerful method to solve such decision problems when p(Æ) is
not known, but – potentially imprecise – data from previous repetitions or expert judge-
ments are available. If one had inﬁnitely many – precise – observations, one would be able
to apply the Bernoulli principle based on a consistent plug-in estimator of p(Æ). In1 Alternatively a loss function l(a,x) is assigned, which can be embedded into the framework proposed by
setting u(a,x) = l(a,x). Po denotes the power set.
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estimation of p, and alternative methods are needed taking into account the lack of com-
plete information explicitly. To achieve this, we base our proposal on Walley’s imprecise
Dirichlet model [50], and a recent generalization of it [46].3. Walley’s imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM)
The observations xj are assumed to be categorical, unordered and exchangeable. Then
the corresponding multivariate random quantity nj counting the number of occurrences of
the jth category follows a multinomial distribution with parameter vector p. In a Bayesian
setting the corresponding conjugated prior is the (precise) Dirichlet (s, t) prior distribution
(e.g. [17]), where t = (t1, . . . , tm) is a certain element of the interior of the unit simplex
denoted by S(1,m). The parameter ti 2 (0,1), i = 1, . . . ,m is the mean of pi under the
Dirichlet prior; the hyperparameter s > 0 determines the inﬂuence of the prior distribution
on posterior probabilities.
An important argument against the use of the PDM is that – at least without a huge
amount of observations – inferences depend to a considerable extent on the value of t
to be ﬁxed in advance, typically without having suﬃcient information to guide the choice.
Moreover, there is the desire for a model where the predictive probabilities used in deci-
sion making directly reﬂect the sample size, i.e. the amount of statistical information
available.
Both problems are simultaneously addressed by the imprecise Dirichlet model as
deﬁned by Walley [50]. It avoids unjustiﬁable prior choices of t by relying on the set of
all Dirichlet (s, t) distributions such that t 2 S(1,m), and the inferences depend – via the
width of the intervals for the predictive probability obtained – on the sample size. In
the IDM, there is a hyperparameter s determining how quickly upper and lower probabil-
ities of events converge as statistical data accumulate. s can be interpreted as either the
number of observations needed to reduce the imprecision (i.e. the diﬀerence between upper
and lower probabilities) to half its initial value, or alternatively as the virtual number of
yet unseen observations. Consequently, smaller values of s produce faster convergence
and stronger conclusions, whereas large values of s produce more cautious inferences.
At the same time, according to Walley, the value of s must not depend on m or the number
of observations. A detailed discussion concerning the parameter s and the IDM can be
found in particular in [7,50].
To derive the predictive lower and upper probabilities assigned by the IDM, let A be
any non-trivial subset of the sample space X = {x1, . . . ,xm}, i.e., A5 ; and A5 X,
and let n(A) denote the observed number of occurrences of A in N trials,
nðAÞ ¼Pxj2Anj where nj :¼ n({xj}). Then the predictive probability P(Ajn, t, s) under a
certain Dirichlet posterior distribution is
P ðAjn; t; sÞ ¼ nðAÞ þ stðAÞ
N þ s ;
where tðAÞ :¼Pxj2Atj. This assignment is completed by taking P(Ajn, t, s) :¼ 0 if A is
empty, and P(Ajn, t, s) :¼ 1 if A = X. By maximizing and minimizing P(Ajn, t, s) over
t 2 S(1,m), Walley [50] obtains the posterior lower and upper predictive probabilities of
A as
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N þ s ; P ðAjn; sÞ ¼
nðAÞ þ s
N þ s :
An illuminating non-Bayesian view of this model as -contaminated relative frequencies is
provided by [41].
4. Decision making by using the imprecise Dirichlet model
As a preparation, let us brieﬂy consider an approach for decision making under the
condition that p satisﬁes to the PDM and there are perfect observations of states of nature,
namely the numbers (n1, . . . ,nm) of occurrences of x1, . . . ,xm in the N trials. By relying on
Bayesian methodology, the expected utility of an action k is calculated as follows:
EuðkÞ ¼
Z
Sð1;mÞ
Xm
i¼1
ðuðk;xiÞ  piÞpðpÞdp ¼
Xm
i¼1
uðk;xiÞ 
Z
Sð1;mÞ
pipðpÞdp
¼
Xm
i¼1
uðk;xiÞ  Eppi;
where Eppi ¼ niþstiNþs , ﬁnally resulting in
EuðkÞ ¼
Xm
i¼1
uðk;xiÞ ni þ stiN þ s : ð2Þ
Passing over to the IDM leads to lower and upper expected utilities arising from the fol-
lowing optimization problems:
EuðkÞ ¼ inf
t2Sð1;mÞ
EuðkÞ; EuðkÞ ¼ sup
t2Sð1;mÞ
EuðkÞ: ð3Þ
In literature several criteria have been suggested to compare the interval-valued expected
utility
½EuðkÞ; EuðkÞ ð4Þ
of actions k (see, in particular, the recent survey by [45] as well as [48], who both give fur-
ther references).2 Two types of criteria may be distinguished with respect to their ordering
properties. The ﬁrst branch, like the criterion of maximality (as proposed by [49]) or the
concept of E-admissibility (advocated by [34,38]), renounces the completeness of the
ordering and generalizes the concept of admissibility by distinguishing a set of actions
as being undominated, i.e. not inferior.
On the other hand, often a complete ordering of the actions is desired, and to achieve
this the interval-valued expected utility eventually has to be transformed to the real line.
The most conservative choice is to be strictly ambiguity averse, concentrating on the lower
interval limit only. (Sections 5 and 6 will rely on this criterion, while Section 7 brieﬂy will
consider alternative criteria.)2 For rigorous axiomatic justiﬁcations of generalized expected utility in the sense of (4) as well as diﬀerent
criteria derived from it see among others [21,22] and the work cited there. Relying on these results it is possible to
extend Neumann–Morgenstern and Anscombe–Aumann theory to the situation of complex uncertainty with
partial prior information.
L.V. Utkin, Th. Augustin / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 44 (2007) 322–338 3275. Decision making under strict ambiguity aversion
Under strict ambiguity aversion one tries to be safe in the worst situation, i.e. one eval-
uates every action by its minimal expected utility among all probabilities in accordance
with P(Æ) and P ðÞ. Consequently, an action k* is optimal iﬀ for all k the inequality
EuðkÞP EuðkÞ is satisﬁed.3 An algorithm to calculate k* is described in
Proposition 1. The optimal randomized action k* satisfying the inequality EuðkÞP EuðkÞ
for all k is determined by solving the following linear programming problem:
G ! max
k;G
4 ð5Þ
subject to G 2 R; k  1 ¼ 1, and for j = 1, . . . ,m,
G 6 1
N þ s
Xn
r¼1
kr s  ur þ
Xm
i¼1
uri  ni
 !
: ð6ÞProof. It follows from (2) that k* is found by considering
inf
t2Sð1;mÞ
Xm
i¼1
Xn
r¼1
urikr  ni þ stiN þ s ! maxk ð7Þ
subject to k Æ 1 = 1. For solving this problem, let us adapt [1,3], who suggested to introduce
a new variable G ¼ inf t2Sð1;mÞEuðkÞ. Then problem (7) is equivalent to a problem with
objective function (5) and with the inﬁnite number of constraints
G 6
Xm
i¼1
Xn
r¼1
urikr  ni þ stiN þ s ; t 2 Sð1;mÞ; ð8Þ
and G 2 R; k  1 ¼ 1. Following [1,3] further, note that the constraints are already
satisﬁed, if they are satisﬁed for all extreme points of the convex sets of distributions
deﬁned by P(Æjn, s) and P ðjn; sÞ, which are simply obtained by considering the extreme
points of S(1,m). The latter have the form (1,0, . . . , 0), (0,1, . . . , 0), . . . , (0, 0, . . . , 1).5 There-
fore, (8) is reduced to the set of m linear constraints described in (6), as was to be
proven.6 h
Restricting kr to be either 0 or 1 optimal unrandomized actions are obtained via3 This criterion has been proposed under diﬀerent names. It corresponds to the Gamma-Minimax criterion (as
considered, e.g., in [5, Section 4.7.6]), to the Maxmin expected utility model [24], to the MaxEMin criterion
investigated by [31] (cf. also [32] and the references therein) and the notion of maximinity in [49]. In the case of
two-monotone capacities it is equivalent to maximizing Choquet expected utility (as studied, e.g., in [9]).
4 This abbreviation, which is used throughout the paper, stands for task to maximize the objective function G
with respect to the variables k and G, subject to the constraints that are following.
5 To be exact, the extreme points are of the form (1  (m  1) Æ e, e, . . . , e), where e becomes arbitrarily small.
6 An alternative proof can rely on total monotonicity of the lower interval limit derived from the IDM and the
equivalence shown at the beginning of Section 6.2 and the formula from footnote 8, again circumventing minima
by auxiliary variables.
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Euk P Eur, for all r = 1, . . . , n, is determined by solving the following problem:
1
N þ s s  ur þ
Xm
i¼1
urini
 !
! max
r
; r 2 f1; . . . ; ng: ð9Þ
It can be seen from (9) that the objective function is nothing else but a mixture of two
criteria: the criterion of maximum expected utility, with probabilities p({xi}) replaced by
the corresponding relative frequency ni/N, and Wald’s criterion. The weights N/(N + s)
and s/(N + s), respectively, are directly connected to the uncertainty involved, depending
on the hyperparameter s and the sample size N. Consequently, when N = 0, i.e., before any
observation on the states of nature is available, Wald’s criterion is used. On the other
hand, when the sample size tends to inﬁnity, i.e. when there are enough data to estimate
p(Æ) with very low variance, expected utility based on the estimate of p(Æ) is used. In this
sense, (9) is a frequency-based type of Hodges–Lehmann criterion (cp. [28]), which has
been proposed in classical decision theory as a compromise between the Bayesian and
the minimax approach. As a welcome by-product, Eq. (9) also provides a behavioral inter-
pretation of the hyperparameter s: In principle, one could develop canonical examples to
determine a decision maker’s value of s in an experimental manner.
A closer investigation of (9) shows, however, also a possibly unwanted eﬀect: When the
utility function is such that ur is the same for all actions ar, then the ﬁrst summand in (9)
does not matter and
P
urini
Nþs is maximized, which distinguishes the same action as optimal as
the naive frequentist approach where in (7) the probability p(Æ) is replaced by the vector of
observed relative frequencies. Following up on this matter, note that, in principle, such a
situation can always be constructed, by adding a ‘‘bad’’ state of nature x0 (like ‘‘crash of
the economic system’’ in the example in Section 6.4) that has constant utility u0 for all
actions such that u0 < minr,iuri. This means that – just as in minimax theory – special atten-
tion has to be paid to careful selection of the states of nature that are taken into consid-
eration. To turn it into other – even more trenchant – words: The representation
invariance principle (RIP), which is understood as being crucial for the IDM, cannot be
extended to decision making in a straightforward manner. As the RIP says, the lower
and upper posterior and predictive probabilities of some event A do not depend on the
sample space in which A and the previous observations are presented, but, as just argued,
the optimal action may do so.
6. Decision making under incomplete data
Now consideration is extended to the practically quite important case of imprecise
observations, where observations may be too vague to be associated with a certain single-
ton {xj}. Instead it is only known that the realized state of nature lies in some subset
Ai  X, see, for instance [27] for examples in the context of biometrics. Heitjan and Rubin,
who have coined the term coarsened for such data, derive in [26] – rather severe – condi-
tions under which the coarsening may be handled in an easy way. Blumenthal (cf. [8]) dis-
cusses a multinomial model under the additional assumption that the probability
distribution of the coarsening process is known.
However, quite often Heitjan and Rubin’s so-called coarsening at random assumption
is violated and the naive, straightforward analysis would be heavily biased. The same
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menthal’s model is misspeciﬁed. Therefore a thorough analysis without relying on unjus-
tiﬁed assumptions is highly desirable (see, in particular [55] for a general framework).
Several authors, among them [44], have understood Dempster–Shafer belief functions/ran-
dom sets as an appropriate tool to model such situations: they use so-to-say empirical
belief functions (see below) based on relative frequencies of the observed subsets Ai for
the analysis. Although then incompleteness in the observations is taken into account, still
a severe bias may occur, because this way to proceed neglects – by implicitly equating rel-
ative observed frequencies and probabilities – ﬁnite sample variation, which may have, as
argued above and later, a strong distorting eﬀect, too.6.1. Extended empirical belief functions
In order to handle both sources of potential bias – imprecision in the observations as
well as the limited sample size – we rely on a model recently developed by [46], which,
in essence, considers all multinomial models compatible with the data and will lead to a
powerful extension of empirical belief functions.
To be a bit more precise (for a detailed account the reader is referred to [46]): Data con-
sist now of ci observations of the non-empty subset Ai  X, i = 1, . . . ,M, such thatPM
i¼1ci ¼ N . Furthermore, it is helpful to introduce sets Ji denoting the set of indices of
states of nature belonging to Ai, i.e. Ai = {xj : j 2 Ji}. Evidently the standard case is
included: there all available subsets consist of singletons, i.e., M = m, Aj = {xj} and
Jj = {j}, j = 1, . . . ,m. The case Ai0 ¼ X for some i0 represents in a straightforward manner
cautious treatment of missing data.
Translating the situation into an urn model, we have m urns x1, . . . ,xm (corresponding
to the states of nature), where xj consists of balls with number j. Relying on the notation
just introduced, we randomly choose subsets Ai of urns and take randomly ci balls from
the urns numbered by elements of Ji. Given M, there exist diﬀerent possible combinations
k = 1, . . . ,K of numbers of balls taken from the urns. Denote the kth possible vector of
balls by nðkÞ ¼ ðnðkÞ1 ; . . . ; nðkÞm Þ, where nkl ; l ¼ 1; . . . ;m, is the number of balls with number
l drawn in theM choices, and let c = (c1, . . . ,cn). Assuming that the subsets Ai are indepen-
dently chosen from the set of all subsets of X and that the probability of selecting a ball
from the jth urn is pj, every combination of balls produces one standard multinomial
model. A number of possible combinations of balls produce the same number of standard
multinomial models. Moreover, we cannot prefer one model over another.
Since we have a set of vectors n(k), then even if we know precisely the predictive prob-
abilities P(Ajn(k)) for every event A in X and every possible vector n(k), still we can only
compute lower and upper probabilities for events A:
P ðAjcÞ ¼ min
k
PðAjnðkÞÞ; PðAjcÞ ¼ max
k
PðAjnðkÞÞ:
As the vectors n(k) depend on c, the resulting lower and upper probabilities (after minimiz-
ing and maximizing P(Ajn(k))) depend on c, and so it makes indeed sense to denote them
by P(Ajc) and P ðAjcÞ.
Following the same argumentation as above, using the IDM allows us – in contrast to
the PDM – to take into account lack of prior information and the possible fact that the
number of observations may be rather small. Then the lower and upper probabilities
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are computed as follows:
PðAjc; sÞ ¼ minkn
ðkÞðAÞ þ s  inf t2Sð1;mÞtðAÞ
N þ s ;
PðAjc; sÞ ¼ maxkn
ðkÞðAÞ þ s  supt2Sð1;mÞtðAÞ
N þ s ;
where tðAÞ :¼Pj2J tj and nðkÞðAÞ :¼Pj2JnðkÞj .
It can be shown that the resulting lower and upper probabilities of A can be obtained
from the observations A1, . . . ,AM and c1, . . . ,cM as follows:
P ðAjc; sÞ ¼
P
i:AiAci
N þ s ; P ðAjc; sÞ ¼
P
i:Ai\A6¼£ci þ s
N þ s : ð10Þ
For a closer investigation of these results, it helps to consider them within the framework
of Dempster–Shafer theory (e.g. [18,42]): With [35] we call a basic probability assignment
m : PoðXÞ ! ½0; 1, with mð£Þ ¼ 1,PA2PoðXÞmðAÞ ¼ 1 and the corresponding belief Bel(A)
and plausibility Pl(A) functions with BelðAÞ ¼PBAmðBÞ, PlðAÞ ¼ 1 BelðAcÞ empirical,
when
mðAiÞ ¼ ciN
based on a vector c1, . . . ,cM of
PM
i¼1ci ¼ N observations of Ai  X, i = 1, . . . ,M, and
m(B) = 0 for the remaining events B 2 X. It is easy to see that the lower and upper prob-
abilities (10) relate to these belief and plausibility functions in the following way:7
P ðAjc; sÞ ¼ N  BelðAÞ
N þ s ; P ðAjc; sÞ ¼
N  PlðAÞ þ s
N þ s :
Moreover, P(Ajc, s) and P ðAjc; sÞ are belief and plausibility functions again, namely with
the basic probability assignment m*(Ai) = ci/(N + s) for every Ai, m(B) = 0 for the remain-
ing sets B ( X and m*(AX) = s/(N + s), i.e., P(Ajc, s) and P ðAjc; sÞ can be obtained as
empirical belief and plausibility functions by assuming that there are s additional observa-
tions X. With m(Ai) = ci/N representing the standard empirical assignment, we have
m*(Ai) = m(Ai) Æ N/(N + s), and, for all A5 X,
PðAjc; sÞ ¼
X
i:AiA
mðAiÞ;
PðAjc; sÞ ¼
X
i:Ai\A 6¼£
mðAiÞ;
which we call extended empirical belief and plausibility functions.
6.2. Decision making with extended empirical belief functions
Again two ways to use such information in decision making suggest themselves: The
ﬁrst one uses the extended empirical belief functions from the previous subsection, and7 A detailed study of extended empirical belief functions derived from the imprecise Dirichlet model is presented
in [46].
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½EMuðkÞ; EMuðkÞ with
EMuðkÞ :¼ inf
p2M
EpuðkÞ and EMuðkÞ :¼ sup
p2M
EpuðkÞ;
whereM is the corresponding structure, i.e. the set of classical probabilities p(Æ) dominat-
ing P(Æ), i.e.
M ¼ fpðÞjP ðAjc; sÞ 6 pðAÞg: ð11Þ
In this context it is very convenient to note that extended empirical belief functions are still
belief functions, and so we can use an approach based on the Choquet integral [10,43],
which directly relies on basic probability assignment m*(Æ).8 In the situation under consid-
eration described by the basic probability assignment m*(Æ), the lower expected utility can
be rewritten as follows:
EMuðkÞ ¼ sN þ s minxi2X uðk;xiÞ þ
XM
k¼1
ck
N þ s  minxi2Ak uðk;xiÞ: ð12Þ
The second way directly understands the situation as a collection of imprecise Dirichlet
models, where each of them is associated with an expected utility according to (3). Taking
the lower and upper envelope yields ½EuðkÞ; EuðkÞ with
EuðkÞ ¼ min
k
inf
t2Sð1;mÞ
EðkÞuðkÞ ¼ min
k
inf
t2Sð1;mÞ
Xm
i¼1
uðk;xiÞ  n
ðkÞ
i þ sti
N þ s : ð13Þ
In general,
EMuðkÞ 6 EuðkÞ 6 EuðkÞ 6 EMuðkÞ; ð14Þ
but both ways need not coincide (use e.g. the example from [49, p. 82ﬀ.]). Here, however,
we obtain
Proposition 2. Comparing (12) and (13) yields
EMuðkÞ ¼ EuðkÞ and EuðkÞ ¼ EMuðkÞ: ð15ÞProof. According to (14), it is suﬃcient to show EMuðkÞP EuðkÞ. This can be achieved by
constructing a constellation where EðkÞuðkÞ ¼ EMuðkÞ. For this purpose consider that vec-
tor n where for every Ak the corresponding ck is completely assigned to that state, where
u(k,xi) is minimal. The corresponding expectation coincides with (12). h
Eﬃcient handling of the resulting decision problem is summarized in8 More precisely, two-monotonicity of the lower probability P(Æ) and the upper probability PðÞ would be
suﬃcient to represent expectations in the spirit of [11] via the Moebius inverse of P(Æ) (cf. [10, Corollary 4]),
yielding for any random variable X on X
EX ¼
X
AX
mðAÞ min
x2A
X ðxÞ:
.
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Dirichlet model with the hyperparameter s and information about the states is represented in
the form of ci observations of subsets Ai = {xj : j 2 Ji}, i = 1, . . . ,M, such that
PM
i¼1ci ¼ N ,
then the optimal randomized action k* satisfying the inequality EuðkÞP EuðkÞ for all k is
determined by solving the following linear programming problem:9
1
N þ s s  V 0 þ
XM
k¼1
ck  V k
 !
! max
k
subject to V 0; V i 2 R, k Æ 1 = 1,
V i 6
Xn
r¼1
krurj; i ¼ 1; . . . ;M ; j 2 J i; V 0 6
Xn
r¼1
krurj; j ¼ 1; . . . ;m:Proof. We introduce new variables V i ¼ minj2J iuðk;xjÞ, i = 1, . . . ,M, and V0 =
minj=1,. . .,mu(k,xj), and substitute them into the objective function. Constraints of the
optimization problem are derived from the deﬁnition of Vi, i = 0, . . . ,M. h
The extension of Corollary 1 to the situation under consideration is provided by
Corollary 2. The optimal unrandomized action (pure action) ar satisfying the inequality
Eur P Euk for all k = 1, . . . , n is determined by solving:
1
N þ s s  ur þ
XM
k¼1
ck  min
xi2Ak
uri
 !
! max
r
; r 2 f1; . . . ; ;ng: ð16ÞProof. If kr 2 {0,1}, then V k ¼ minxi2Ak uri and V0 = ur due to conditions sP 0 and
ckP 0. h
Before we illustrate our approach by a short example in Section 6.4, some additional
remarks may be appropriate. Firstly, we mention an equivalent alternative to proceed.
After that, in Section 6.3, the advantages of the extended modelling will be demonstrated
in some extreme cases.
Remark 1. Since the information about states of nature is represented by means of lower
P(Ajc, s) and upper P ðAjc; sÞ probabilities of all events A 2 X, the decision problem can
also be solved by means of the approach proposed by [1,3], where the extreme points
needed can be directly derived from the corresponding basic probability assignment
m*(Æ).109 The problem considered in Proposition 3 has
PM
i¼1jJ ij þ mþ nþ 1 linear constraints and 2m + 1 optimization
variables. (Here jJij denotes the cardinality of the set Ji.) If all the subsets Ai consist of the single elements xi,
resulting in ci = ni, andM = m, then we get back, after simple transformations, the special case studied in Section
5.
10 As another variant, the resulting lower and upper probabilities can be interpreted as arising from a special
type of a generalized basic probability assignment in the sense of [4] (see also [14]), constructed from the set of
IDMs that are derived from the diﬀerent possible observations.
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One of the main shortcomings of using standard empirical belief functions in decision
making is that they assign zero probabilities to yet unobserved states of nature. If we had
an inﬁnite number of observations, then the fact of zero probabilities could be accepted.
However, if we have a ﬁnite number of observations (and more often quite a small num-
ber), then this fact may indeed lead to controversial results, as can be seen in a most pro-
nounced way by considering the following decision problem: A ¼ fa1; a2g; X ¼ fx1;x2g,
the utility function is u11 = 1000, u12 = 1, u21 = u22 = 0. Suppose that there is only one
judgment (M = 1) such that A1 = {x2}. Using standard belief functions, which means
to rely on s = 0, we obtain Eu1 ¼ 1 and Eu2 ¼ 0. Hence the optimal action is a1, i.e. under
almost complete ignorance, where we naturally intend to be cautious, we make the opti-
mistic decision because the model using standard empirical belief functions concludes that
the probability of state x1 is 0, and so it acts as if this state could never be observed. How-
ever, if we take s > 0, say s = 1, then Eu1 ¼ ð1000þ 1Þ=2 ¼ 499:5 and Eu2 ¼ 0. Hence
the optimal action is a2, showing that the IDM indeed provides a way to avoid such over-
optimistic reasoning.
A related, again rather problematic, issue of standard empirical belief functions is that
the assignments do not depend on the sample size and therefore – the potentially very
high – ﬁnite sampling variation is neglected: Consider, for instance, two samples taken
from the same sample space, one with n = 2, the other one with n = 200,000.11 If in the
ﬁrst case n1 = 1 = n2, and in the second one n1 = 100,000 = n2, then the relative frequen-
cies for the states 1 and 2 are 1/2 each, in both cases, and therefore also the standard belief
functions derived from them are the same, not distinguishing these substantially diﬀerent
situations. In contrast, the extended belief function approach takes into account that the
second information is build on a much stronger basis: the imprecision in the assignment
arising from the second situation is much less than that from the ﬁrst one.
The problem becomes in particular drastic, when we return to a situation with unob-
served states of nature and consider again the numerical example given above. If we have
l identical observations of the second state of nature, then
Eu1 ¼  1000  slþ s þ
l
lþ s ; Eu2 ¼ 0:
When s = 0 then neither Eu1 ¼ 1 nor Eu2 ¼ 0 depend on l. That is, our decision a2 is the
same irrespective of having 1 single observation (almost complete ignorance) or 10,000
identical observations (suﬃcient statistical data). If we take s = 1, then a2 is only superior
when l > 1000.6.4. Numerical example
Consider the following toy example of a simpliﬁed investment decision. The states of
nature are the states of economy during one year: growth – x1, medium growth – x2,11 To focus on the essential point of the argument we further assume in this example that all observations are
precise.
Table 1
Values of the utility function urj
Actions States of nature
x1 x2 x3 x4
Bonds a1 6 9 9 8
Stocks a2 12 7 3 2
Deposit a3 7 7 7 7
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given rates of return as shown in the body of Table 1.
Suppose that three experts, relying on independent sources of information,12 supply the
following judgments concerning the states of economy: two experts (c1 = 2) believe that
the state of economy will be ‘‘growth’’ or ‘‘medium growth’’ (A1 = {x1,x2}), one expert
(c2 = 1) supposes that the state of economy will be ‘‘no’’ or ‘‘medium growth’’
(A2 = {x2,x3}). So, M = 2, N = 3.
Let us ﬁnd the optimal randomized action maximizing the lower expected utility under
the condition s = 1. By using Proposition 3, we arrive at the following problem:
1
3þ 1 ð1  V 0 þ 2  V 1 þ 1  V 2Þ ! maxk;V 1;V 2;V 3
subject to k 2 R3þ; V i 2 R, k1 + k2 + k3 = 1 and
V 1 6 6k1 þ 12k2 þ 7k3; V 0 6 6k1 þ 12k2 þ 7k3;
V 1 6 9k1 þ 7k2 þ 7k3; V 0 6 9k1 þ 7k2 þ 7k3;
V 2 6 9k1 þ 7k2 þ 7k3; V 0 6 9k1 þ 3k2 þ 7k3;
V 2 6 9k1 þ 3k2 þ 7k3; V 0 6 8k1  2k2 þ 7k3:
Hence V0 = 27/4, V1 = 27/4, V2 = 33/4, k

1 ¼ 7=8; k2 ¼ 1=8; k3 ¼ 0. The optimal lower
expected utility is 7.125.
Let us now ﬁnd the optimal unrandomized action: by using (16) we get Eu1 ¼ 6:75,
Eu2 ¼ 3:75, Eu3 ¼ 7. This implies that the third action is optimal.
It could be noted that, by taking s = 0, the optimal randomized action would be
k1 ¼ 5=8, k2 ¼ 3=8, k3 ¼ 0, with an optimal lower expected utility of 7.75. At a ﬁrst glance
one might be tempted to say that the decision based on s = 0 would be better than that
based on s > 0 because the lower expected utility in the case s = 0 is larger than the lower
expected utility based on s = 1. However, as discussed in the previous subsection, this deci-
sion is incautious; the model in which it is optimal neglects the fact that the number of
judgments is very small (N = 3). The optimal unrandomized action taking s = 0 is not
unique because Eu1 ¼ Eu3 and Eu2 < Eu1 in this case.
7. Other optimality criteria
In this paper up to now only one particular – quite pessimistic – optimality criterion has
been studied. As a considerable improvement a more complex criterion of decision making12 The assumption of independence is crucial for direct applications of the multinomial likelihood underlying the
IDM. Relaxations of this assumption are currently under investigation.
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parameter g 2 [0, 1] (cp., e.g. [19,39,51]) can be considered. The caution parameter reﬂects
the degree of ambiguity aversion; the more ambiguity averse the decision maker is, the
higher is the inﬂuence of the lower interval limit of the generalized expected utility.
g = 1 corresponds to strict ambiguity aversion, g = 0 expresses maximal ambiguity seeking
attitudes. Methods for the choice of g are considered in detail by [39; 51, Chapter 2.6].
Relying on this criterion, a pure action ak is distinguished as optimal iﬀ for all
r 2 {1, . . . ,n}
gEuk þ ð1 gÞEuk P gEur þ ð1 gÞEur:
The lower expected utility Eur is computed by means of (16). The upper expected utility Eur
can be found in the same way, leading to the expression
gEur þ ð1 gÞEur ¼ sN þ s ðgur þ ð1 gÞurÞ
þ 1
N þ s
XM
i¼1
ci gmin
j2J i
urj þ ð1 gÞmax
j2J i
urj
  !
:
It can be seen that the algorithm for computing the optimal pure action taking into ac-
count both lower and upper expected utilities is similar to the approach proposed in Cor-
ollary 1. However, it should be noted that the randomized action cannot be found in the
same simple way; eﬃcient algorithms for solving this problem are currently investigated
(see also, in the light of Remark 1, Section 4 of [48]).
Of course, also criteria not necessarily producing a linear ordering of the actions
deserve attention (cf. Section 4). [30; 48, Section 5] propose, independently of each other,
closely related methods to determine E-admissible actions, which can – again referring to
Remark 1 – also be used here: A pure action ai can be shown to be E-admissible, if and
only if, with M from (11),
Pi ¼ pðÞ 2M
Xm
j¼1
uðai; #jÞpð#jÞP
Xm
j¼1
uðal; #jÞpð#jÞ; 8l ¼ 1; . . . ; n

)
6¼ ;
(
;
i.e., if and only if the linear programming problem
z ! max
ðpT ;zÞTXm
j¼1
uðai; #jÞpð#jÞP
Xm
j¼1
uðal; #jÞpð#jÞ; 8l ¼ 1; . . . ; n; ð17Þ
Xm
j¼1
pð#jÞ ¼ z; z 6 1; pð#jÞP 0; j ¼ 1; . . . ;m;
P ðAjc; sÞ 6
X
x2A
pðxÞ 6 PðAjc; sÞ 8A  X
has an optimal solution with z = 1. Ref. [48] also extends this algorithm to determine opti-
mal randomized actions, which are, if admissibility is assured (e.g. by P({x}jc, s) > 0,
"x 2 X) also maximal.
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A method for decision making under imprecise information using the IDM has been
proposed in this paper. This approach can also be regarded as a particular extension of
the procedure relying on empirical belief functions. The considered special cases and the
numerical example have shown that the method is reasonable even in cases where the num-
ber of possible imperfect measurements or judgements is very small.
De Cooman and Zaﬀalon [15,54,55] have developed a general framework for condition-
ing and updating under incomplete data. It could be applied to the IDM, the derivation of
which is based on Bayesian updating of all Dirichlet priors. The approach advocated here
in Section 6.1 to derive the predictive probabilities based on coarse data is certainly very
similar in spirit and it will be illuminating to explore the exact relationship in detail. Spe-
cial attention should be paid to a careful study of the representation invariance principle,
which is crucial in Walley’s argumentation for the IDM. From the considerations at the
end of Section 5 it can be concluded that the optimal action may depend on the choice
of the sample space, and so the representation invariance principle cannot be extended
to the decision theoretic context in a straightforward manner.
Further research should also include a thorough comparison with alternative ways to
proceed. This includes ﬁrstly other approaches to derive predictive lower and upper prob-
abilities from multinomial observations under lacking prior knowledge [11,52] and sec-
ondly an alternative decision theoretic approach where the sampling information is
handled by decision functions ([2], see also [29,40,25] for related issues). For the later note
that – in the context considered here in contrast to classical subjective expected utility the-
ory based on precise prior probabilities – optimality with respect to posterior expected util-
ity/loss and optimality of decision functions with respect to prior expected risk are no
longer necessarily fully compatible.
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